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Abstract
This article explores how we might understand the relationships between music, emotion
and self-identity. My goal is primarily theory-building but I also draw upon some
empirical work. I begin by claiming that there is a dominant conception of music,
emotion and personal identity in sociologically-informed analysis of music, and I show
this by examining work by three leading analysts. This dominant conception sees music
primarily as a positive resource for active self-making. My argument is that this
conception rests on a problematic notion of the self and also on an overly optimistic
understanding of music, which implicitly sees music as somehow independent of
negative social and historical processes. I then draw on other theorists to attempt to
construct a) a more adequately critical conception of personal identity in modern
societies; and b) a more balanced appraisal of music-society relations. In particular, I
suggest two ways in which relations between self, music and society may not always be
quite so positive or as healthy as the dominant conception suggests. The first is that
music, with its strong links to the emotions and to values of personal authenticity, may
well have become bound up with the incorporation of emotional self-realisation,
authenticity and creativity into capitalism, and with intensified consumption habits,
processes that some writers plausibly claim may be having damaging effects on the
psychological health of human individuals. These possibilities are explored via analysis of
an interview with a man who has a particularly strong attachment to musical
consumption. The second is that such emotional self-realisation is linked to status
competition, in particular over the degree to which individuals are ‘emotionally sensitive’
and over involvement in hedonistic collective activity. Again I examine interview material
to explore these possibilities. In the conclusion, I draw out some implications of the
piece for the study of musical consumption, and for cultural consumption in general. I
also briefly distinguish my perspective from two other critical perspectives that a hasty
reading might confuse with my own, those influenced by Adorno and Foucault.
***
Music provides a particularly interesting example of modern relations between
consumption and self-identity. Many people report that music plays a very important role
in their lives. This role does not appear to have diminished with industrialisation,
commodification, and the mass consumption of music; if anything it has grown. The
2continuing and perhaps growing importance of music in everyday life may be based on
two contrasting but co-existing dimensions of musical experience in modern societies.
The first is that music often feels intensely and emotionally linked to the private self. As
one leading music sociologist has put it, music is a set of cultural practices that have
come to be intricately bound up with the realm of the personal and the subjective
(Martin, 1995: 2). The second is that music is often the basis of collective, public
experiences, whether in live performance, or simply by virtue of the fact that thousands
and sometimes millions of people can come to own the same recordings. These features
are not necessarily contradictory; in fact, they may support and reinforce each other. Our
excitement or sadness can be intensified through the sense that such emotions in
response to a particular piece of music are shared, or even potentially shared. This feeling
can be especially strong at a live performance, but it is just as possible when experiencing
music individually, when we might, however semi-consciously and fleetingly, imagine
others - a particular person, or untold thousands - being able to share that response.
(This is one of the pleasures of pop music, and also perhaps a reason why many people
are suspicious of it.)
Music, then, represents a remarkable meeting point of the private and public realms,
providing encounters of self-identity (this is who I am, this is who I’m not) with
collective identity (this is who we are, this is who we’re not). Of course all cultural
products have this potential – films, television programmes, even shoes and cars. Yet
music’s often-noted link to the emotions arguably makes it an especially powerful site for
such encounters. Whether music really is more strongly connected to the emotions than
other cultural forms, the fact that it is widely assumed to be so is itself significant. For we
now live in societies where the private self has never been, in sociologist Eva Illouz’s
words, ‘so publicly performed and [so] harnessed to the values of the economic and
public spheres’ (Illouz, 2007: 4). It is no longer possible to sustain the idea that the
private sphere offers some kind of opposition to, or protection from, a world of public
power, with the former understood as ‘warm’ and intimate, and the latter as a ‘cold’,
rational, administrative domain. Of course many people cope with the demands of their
working lives by telling themselves that their private realm offers a ‘haven in a heartless
world’ (Lasch, 1977). But in reality those realms we think of as ‘personal’ – our inner
selves, and our relationships with families, lovers and close friends - are hugely affected
by the world beyond them. This may be more so now than ever, as powerful
commercial and state institutions in advanced industrial countries increasingly require
autonomy, creativity and emotional roundedness in their employees and citizens – an
issue I investigate below. This means that music, with its real or projected connections
with the emotions and with self-realisation, may itself be increasingly politicised.
This article therefore explores how we might understand the relationships between
music, emotion, selfhood and public identity. My goal is primarily theory-building but I
also draw upon some empirical work. 1 I begin by claiming that there is a dominant
1 The empirical material used in this article is drawn from fieldwork interviews carried
out with a range of English and Welsh people about their musical practices, tastes and
values in 2002-4. 42 semi-structured interviews were conducted by a team of seven
interviewers - myself, Stephanie Adams, Lorna Ashcroft, Surinder Guru, Jackie Malone,
Dave Morris and Ian Robinson – funded by The Open University’s National Everyday
Cultures Programme. Recruitment aimed at a balance of social classes, roughly equal mix
of men and women, and a reasonable spread of age groups, from those in their 20s to
those in their 70s. Five interviews were with ‘non-white’ subjects. My thanks to Tony
3conception of music, emotion and personal identity in sociologically-informed analysis of music,
and I show this by examining work by three leading analysts. This dominant conception
sees music primarily as a positive resource for active self-making. My argument is that this
conception rests on a problematic notion of the self and also on an overly optimistic
understanding of music, which implicitly sees music as somehow independent of
negative social and historical processes. I then draw on other theorists to attempt to
construct a) a more adequately critical conception of personal identity in modern
societies; and b) a more balanced appraisal of music-society relations. In particular, I
suggest two ways in which relations between self, music and society may not always be
quite so positive or as healthy as the dominant conception suggests. The first is that
music, with its strong links to the emotions and to values of personal authenticity, may
well have become bound up with the incorporation of emotional self-realisation,
authenticity and creativity into capitalism, and with intensified consumption habits,
processes that some writers plausibly claim may be having damaging effects on the
psychological health of man individuals. These possibilities are explored via analysis of an
interview with a man who has a particularly strong attachment to musical consumption.
The second is that such emotional self-realisation is linked to status competition, in
particular over the degree to which individuals are ‘emotionally sensitive’ and over
involvement in hedonistic collective activity. Again I examine interview material to
explore these possibilities. In the conclusion, I draw out some implications of the piece
for the study of musical consumption, and for cultural consumption in general. I also
briefly distinguish my perspective from two other critical perspectives that a hasty
reading might confuse with my own, those influenced by Adorno and Foucault.
The dominant conception: music as a positive resource for self-identity
In recent studies of musical consumption, a particular view of the relationship between
music, emotion and self-identity has come to prevail. I want to show this by discussing
three important contributions by sociologically-informed commentators. I begin with
anthropologist Ruth Finnegan’s survey of a range of ethnomusicological research
(Finnegan, 2003). Finnegan argues that more attention needs to be paid to emotion in
music. But she is clear that the emphasis should not be on ‘trying to penetrate and pin
down hidden internal states’ but rather ‘on the manner, variably practiced and
conceptualized in different contexts, in which people are personally involved in their
musical engagements’ (p. 188). Finnegan emphasises the sheer range of emotions at work
in musical performance and practice:
It is not so much self-conscious internalized ‘feelings’ – though in
some cultural settings that is indeed one element – as the
contextualized manner of people’s musical engagements: joyfully,
fearfully, attentively, reflectively, proudly; in a spirit of exaltation or
energy or irritation; in sorrowful, celebratory or nostalgic mood; with
boredom (that too!), with dance, with tranquillity. (188)
Finnegan then summarises her view of how music itself figures in people’s emotional
lives.
Whether in deeply intense fashion or more light-touch action, music
provides a human resource through which people can enact their
Bennett and Elizabeth Silva, who directed the Programme, to the other interviewers,
especially Stephanie Adams, and to those interviewed.
4lives with inextricably entwined feeling, thought and imagination.
(ibid)
Music, then, is seen as a resource, and one at the disposal of humans conceived in a
particular way: creative, active, imbued with agency, diverse, and performative (in the
interactionist sense, rather than in the way in which the post-structuralist writer Judith
Butler uses the term).
A second account of music and identity relevant to my concerns in this article is by
Simon Frith, in his book Performing Rites (Frith, 1996). The overall aim of that book is to
provide a sociologically-informed aesthetics of popular music. The book climaxes with
an eloquent account of the power of popular music, which is a summation of this
aesthetics. Underlying this account is the idea that music has a particular and special
ability to offer a route towards self-creation through fantasy. Music
seems to make possible a new kind of self-recognition, to free us
from everyday routines, from the social expectations with which we
are encumbered… Music constructs our sense of identity through
the experiences it offers of the body, time, and sociability,
experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative
cultural narratives. (Frith, 1996: 275)2
This is linked to a very constructionist conception of the self, which seems to
be derived from symbolic interactionism, mediated here through the emphasis
in cultural studies on the centrality of symbolic forms in modern social
processes: ‘Identity comes from the outside, not the inside; it is something we
put or try on, not something we reveal or discover.’ (ibid.) I shall return to this
conception of the self in due course, but the main point I wish to make here is
that here, as in Finnegan’s account, there is a strong sense of music as a
resource that allows people to enrich their lives.
The third contribution is that of Tia DeNora. In two insightful, readable and stimulating
books, Music in Everyday Life (DeNora, 2000) and After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology
(DeNora, 2003), DeNora has made an extremely important contribution to the sociology
of music. As explained above, it is her account of music, emotion and the self that I am
particularly concerned with, and so her chapters on ‘Music as a technology of self’
(DeNora, 2000: 46-74) and ‘How does music “channel” emotions?’ (DeNora, 2003: 83-
117) are most relevant here. Self-identity is understood as a production of the continuing
activity of individuals, rather as a fixed inner essence, as in older conceptions of
personality. The title of the first of these chapters recalls Foucault’s use of the term
‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 2000) but in fact DeNora’s approach to subjectivity
is very un-Foucauldian and owes more to interactionism, pragmatism, and Anthony
Giddens’s conception of modern self-identity as based upon reflexivity (DeNora, 2000:
46; Giddens, 1991). Drawing on interviews and ethnography, DeNora aims to show
music
in action as a device for ordering the self as an agent, and as an object
known and accountable to oneself and others… Music is a material
that actors use to elaborate, to fill out and fill in, to themselves and to
others, modes of aesthetic agency and, with it, subjective stances and
identities (DeNora, 2000: 73-4).
2 I wonder if there are pointers towards a more complex view in Frith’s words. After all,
this is presented as one kind of self-recognition, and the ‘seems’ here hints at an
awareness of the limits of such imaginative self-making.
5Again, as with Finnegan and Frith, there is a strong sense of music as a resource to be
used. This is applied explicitly to emotions: ‘music is a resource for modulating and
structuring the parameters of aesthetic agency – feeling, motivation, desire,
comportment, action style, energy’ (53). This should not be understood as the expression
by music of ‘some internal emotional state’; rather, ‘music is part of the reflexive
constitution of that state’ (57). DeNora calls this kind of reflexive activity ‘emotion work’
(DeNora, 2003: 96; DeNora, 2000: 53). And as with Finnegan (including the latter’s
classic study of The Hidden Musicians – Finnegan, 1989) and Frith, the attitude is
overwhelmingly positive. Time and again, for DeNora, music is found to be enriching
experience, adding to agency, enhancing dimensions of people’s everyday lives. It can be
used for attaining and maintaining states of feeling, for aiding concentration, and more
generally for retrieving memories and therefore ‘remembering/constructing who one is’
(DeNora, 2000: 63). This is demonstrated using a set of interviews and ethnographic
observations with subjects who appear to be overwhelmingly white, middle-class,
educated women.
It is perhaps worth briefly relating this dominant tendency in the study of musical
consumption and experience3 to other research that may be more familiar to readers of
this journal. Reviewing twenty years of articles in The Journal of Consumer Research, Eric J.
Arnould and Craig J. Thompson (2005) identify a number of features of what they call
consumer culture theory (CCT), ‘a family of theoretical perspectives that address the
dynamic relationships between consumer actions, the marketplace, and cultural
meanings’ (868). There are overlaps between the dominant conception outlined above
and key features of this CCT tradition. As Arnould and Thompson put it, ‘CCT research
has emphasized the productive aspect of consumption. [It] explores how consumers
actively rework and transform symbolic meanings encoded in advertisements, brands,
retail settings, or material goods to manifest their particular personal and social
circumstances and further their identity and lifestyle goals…. From this perspective, the
marketplace provides consumers with an expansive and heterogeneous palette of
resources from which to construct individual and collective identities’ (871). Here too,
then, the emphasis is on the active and reflexive agency of consumers – though there is
more stress than in the dominant conception of music consumption and self-identity,
discussed above, on the market origins of the cultural products that provide consumers
with their resources (Frith’s work is a major exception to this – see Frith, 1981).4 In
media sociology too, this emphasis on the active nature of consumption has been
strongly manifest. In some respects, for example, DeNora’s approach recalls the uses and
gratifications tradition in communications research, with its emphasis on how audiences
‘use’ media products to fulfil certain personal needs (for example Herta Herzog, 1941, on
the way women gain ‘emotional release’ from daytime radio serials). In other respects it
has much in common with the ‘uncritical cultural populism’ (McGuigan, 1992) of
audience research in Anglophone media and cultural studies in the 1980s and 1990s,
when a focus on ‘active audiences’ was the basis of what one writer has called a
‘consumptionist orthodoxy’ within those academic fields (Born, 1993).
3 For further critical discussion of cognate studies of musical consumption, including
those derived from theories of neotribalism, see Hesmondhalgh (2005).
4 Arnould and Thompson (2005: 871-2) briefly note the presence of a more critical
strand of CCT work, which sees identities as aligned in some cases ‘with the structural
imperatives of a consumer-driven global economy’.
6Beyond the dominant model: problems of self-realisation in modern societies
I now want to question the positive conception of music, and some assumptions about
the self, underlying the accounts of music, emotion and self-identity discussed above. I
am not doubting that people mobilise music in the various positive ways outlined by
these writers. As I explore elsewhere (Hesmondhalgh, 2007) there are many positive,
emancipatory aspects to people’s relations to music in modern societies. Yet the
dominant conception (music as a positive resource for self-identity) seems to me to
downplay various ways in which music may become implicated in some less pleasant and
even disturbing features of modern life. The dominant conception rightly emphasises the
social nature of music and of self-identity, but if music is as imbricated with social
processes as the dominant conception suggests, then it is hard to see how people’s
engagements with music can be so consistently positive in their effects, when we live in
societies that are marked by inequality, exploitation and suffering. While it is true that
people have been miserable and mistreated in all human societies, it is also the case that,
as numerous sociologists have taught us, including Georg Simmel and C. Wright Mills,
private lives, personal biographies and mental states should not be detached from
history. Can music really be so autonomous that it floats free of social forces? And,
turning to self-identity, might not people’s projects of self-creation (to use DeNora’s
term) or self-recognition (to use Frith’s), and therefore their uses of music as part of these projects,
have some more difficult and troubling dimensions than emerges in the dominant
conception?
There is a psychological dimension to this that I cannot develop in this article but which
I want to signal here. The dominant conception underestimates the psychic difficulties
that individuals face in constructing a coherent and healthy self-identity. It is true to say
that humans can act on their environment and upon their selves, but they surely do so in
ways that are limited not only by social and historical factors (such as poverty,
deprivation, lack of education or training) but also by their own personal biographies.
One need not be a full-on Freudian to recognise that damaging experiences in early life
can place severe constraints on what it is possible to do in later life – including the way
we interact with music, and how we might use it to shape our selves.
In this article, however, it is the way in which emotions and self-identity become bound
up in problematic aspects of modern societies that I want to explore, and then apply to
music. A seminal contribution was by Arlie Hochschild (1983), who analysed workers’
experiences of service employment. These jobs appeared comfortable and rewarding, but
for Hochschild involved new and distinctive forms of control and alienation, whereby
workers were being required to internalise at the deepest level the emotional responses
required to look as though they love their jobs. Her most striking example was the way that
flight attendants are trained to smile by airlines that promote their service on the basis
that ‘our smiles are not painted on’. One implication of Hochschild’s study was that the
emotional self-management made possible by new forms of self-identity in capitalist
modernity can be appropriated in dubious ways by powerful interests. If this is true, then
this suggests that the use of music to achieve emotional self-management – analysed by
DeNora and others - may not always be healthy either.5
5 DeNora refers explicitly to Hochschild’s studies (DeNora, 2003: 96; DeNora, 2000: 53),
including her concept of ‘emotional work’, yet she does not register Hochschild’s critical
orientation, or her contrastive concept of ‘emotional labour’.
7My main interest here though is on the historical dimensions of the appropriation of
goals of self-realisation and autonomy by powerful interests. The German social theorist
Axel Honneth has argued that increasingly, in the twentieth century, ‘members of
Western societies were compelled, urged or encouraged, for the sake of their own future,
to place their very selves at the centre of their own life-planning and practice’ (Honneth,
2003: 469). As a result, individual self-realisation becomes linked to ‘institutionalized
expectations’ and ‘transmuted into a support of the system’s legitimacy’ (p.467). Honneth
does not sufficiently specify what this might mean in his suggestive article, but a more
thorough sociological account, compatible with Honneth’s, is provided by Luc Boltanski
and Eve Chiapello in their tour-de-force The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005). Boltanski and
Chiapello differentiate two principal ways in which capitalist societies have been criticised
– social critique and artistic critique. Social critique emphasises poverty, inequality, the
opportunism and egoism of private interests, and the destruction of social bonds brought
about by capitalism. Artistic critique, with its roots in bohemianism and romanticism,
instead stresses capitalism as a source of disenchantment and inauthenticity, and the
limits it places on freedom, autonomy and creativity (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 35-
8). Boltanski and Chiapello trace how, faced with a crisis of legitimacy and motivation in
the late 1960s, under pressure from both the social and artistic critiques (coming together
in the events of 1968 in France and across much of the world) capitalist institutions
responded by validating the artistic critique, especially critical demands for autonomy in
working life. Measures aimed at providing security for workers were replaced by
measures aimed at relaxing hierarchical control and allowing people to fulfil their
individual potential (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 190). The result is a society based on
a ‘connexionist’ model where the self is an individual enterprise, and where transitory
relationships and commitments are considered more legitimate than stable ones –
because rapidly changing one’s connections can supposedly lead to personal growth and
greater self-realisation. In this connexionist society, individuals are increasingly expected
to take responsibility for their own self, even though that self is borne down upon by all
kinds of social pressures. Honneth, Boltanski and Chiapello all write about the potentially
damaging effects of that pressure on individuals. However consciously sceptical
individuals may be, ‘the ideal of self-realization is experienced … subliminally … as
posing demands upon the manner in which one’s subjectivity is to be formed’, as
Honneth puts it (Honneth, 2003: 467). The result, Honneth claims, drawing on a variety
of sources, is a rise in the levels of depression in society – though depression is not
necessarily to be understood in clinical terms here. It may involve a combination of
‘symptoms of inner emptiness, of feeling oneself to be superfluous’ with ‘hectic and
enervating activities’ (p.478). Boltanski and Chiapello (2005: 420-424), meanwhile, place
greater stress on anxiety and anomie, citing statistics on rising numbers of suicide.
These writers, then, show how the autonomous self-realisation implicitly celebrated by
the dominant conception, has come to be linked to power. All this has a direct relevance
to cultural consumption – and indeed to musical consumption. For Honneth, a key basis
of ‘organised self-realisation’ was that individuals in the twentieth century increasingly
felt compelled ‘to seek an intensification of one’s own feeling of being alive in the
consumption of cultural products’. This derives from a protestant undercurrent in which
an ‘uncommon state of emotional excitement was taken to be a sign of God’s goodness
and grace’ (Honneth, 2003: 478). This co-existed with the protestant work ethic – and
did not necessarily contradict it. For Honneth, drawing on the historian Colin Campbell,
this undercurrent eventually becomes the basis for ‘a massive investment in intensity-
enhancing consumer goods’ (ibid.). Daniel Bell’s thesis that modern individualistic
hedonism contradicts the functional demands of capitalism, leading to crisis, has not
8been borne out. Rather, for Honneth, it has only strengthened capitalism. The presence
of shorter and more fragile bonds between people (powerfully analysed by Sennett, 1998,
among others), and the tendency for leisure to be seen as a key means of self-definition,
do not radically conflict with the needs of the capitalist economy. Indeed, according to
Honneth, these facets of modern societies have become a productive force in their own
right, in that they fuel cultural consumption. Similarly, for Boltanski and Chiapello (2005:
437), in the new connexionist society that has arisen in the wake of capitalism’s
appropriation of the artistic critique, ‘People’s aspirations to mobility, to multiply their
activities, to greater opportunities for being and doing, emerge as a virtually boundless
reservoir of ideas for conceiving new products and services to bring to the market’.
Innovation is strongly connected to this need for liberation, including transport and
automation, but it now includes devices which allow people to be active while mobile.
For Boltanski and Chiapello, intriguingly given our present concerns, music is the
archetypal form of such contradictory freedoms.6
However, there is another way in which music is connected to these developments,
which neither Honneth’s article nor The New Spirit of Capitalism comment upon. This is
music’s own active role in fuelling capitalism’s incorporation of autonomy; in Boltanski
and Chiapello’s terms, its centrality to the artistic critique. The most prominent musical
genres of the last century – jazz, rock, soul and hip hop – have all been strongly tied up
with romantic notions of personal autonomy. Rock in particular accompanied the kind of
historical changes tracked by Boltanski and Chiapello, producing a culture that was
centred on values of rebellious creativity, but which, in retrospect, was assimilated very
quickly to values of commercialism. The mainstream rock music of the 1980s and 1990s,
with its often unchallenging celebrations of mobility and unfettered individuality, can be
seen to conform closely to Boltanski and Chiapello’s connexionist world.7 When dozens
of nostalgic rock documentaries look back to the glory years of rock rebellion, they
provide a comfortable picture of bohemianism for older viewers now immersed in a very
different kind of autonomy.
Such critical perspectives on consumption and self-identity are missing from the
dominant conception which sees music as a positive resource for self-making.
Admittedly, however, these are large-scale sociological-historical claims. A great
challenge is to apply them to the individual lives of people, without doing violence to the
specificity of those lives, or to the undoubted truth that people do have some freedom to
shape their own cultural practices. While the fundamental aim of this article is primarily
to question the theoretical assumptions regarding emotion and self-identity underlying
studies of musical consumption, in the next section I reflect on these issues using
empirical case studies, in the manner of DeNora’s micro-sociological analyses, but
examined from a perspective influenced by the critical and historical accounts outlined
above.
Case study 1: A collector
6 The ambivalent qualities of consumer uses of mobile music devices are well captured by
Michael Bull (2005), in ways that have implications for the dominant conception. For
Bull, users employ i-pods and so on to reclaim urban space, but they do so by privatising
it.
7 The best accounts of this aspect of rock culture are by Simon Frith (1981) and Keir
Keightley (2001).
9As we have seen, both Honneth and Boltanski/Chiapello point to ways in which the
quest for personal meaning and self-realisation in capitalist modernity helps to fuel
consumption, and also to how ‘organised self-realisation’ (partly through consumption,
but also through the development of more formally autonomous types of labour) seems
to be resulting in greater society-wide levels of anxiety and depression. It is interesting in
this context to consider those people who seem to place a particularly strong emphasis
on self-realisation through musical consumption, if only as a limit case, while recognising
their atypicality.
One of our interviewees, Paul, for example, a 40 year old hairdresser, was interviewed in
a room lined with hundreds of CDs and records. His main loves were rock, R&B, soul
and reggae, but his collection included other material too. What united them was music
that was in some way ‘challenging’ (the Rolling Stones, Neil Young and Prince were his
favourites). He had contempt for music that was ‘empty’, with ‘no real feeling’. At the
salon where he worked, Paul was well-known for being a musical aficionado, and his
conversations with customers often centred on music. However, Paul’s collecting was a
source of real tension in his relationship with his wife. In Paul’s presence, his wife Helen
told the interviewer that she found his record collecting and his playing of loud music
obtrusive and irritating. She expressed anger concerning the sheer amount of money Paul
spent on music and music equipment. And in the salon where he worked, Paul could be
very dominant in asserting his views about what kind of music should be played. Paul’s
relationship to music seemed a defiant statement about his independence – both within
the family and within society. He acknowledged that his desire to buy music constantly,
to accrue amounts of music that he could not possibly play more than once or twice, was
irrational, but he revelled in that irrationality.
Paul’s love of music, then, provided an important part of his identity. Whether his
pleasure in music might be understood via DeNora’s concept of reflexive ‘emotional
work’ (see DeNora, 2000: 53-8) however, is another matter. Or at least there were
uncomfortable aspects to his relationship with music, of a kind which barely seem to
appear in the dominant conception of music and self-identity. Active and positive self-
making may have been involved here, but there were some other, more ambivalent
aspects also involved.
It might be objected that Paul’s ‘problems’ here have nothing to do with music, that
music was simply a vehicle through which he and his wife found a reason to express their
ambivalence towards each other. If music had not been there, one might say, they would
have found other ways to quarrel with each other. But this is to see music as passive, as
dead matter with no consequence, rather as active material that has an effect upon the
world, when combined with human agency. It is surely more interesting to ask: what is it
that made music the basis of this disagreement? Why music and not something else? And
here it is important I think that Paul was drawn to rebellious, individualistic music and
expressed disdain for music he considered conformist. Somehow the notion of music as
(at its best) intensely and genuinely expressive comes to stand for Paul as a defence
against what he portrays as the emptiness of much of the rest of the world. This attitude,
it seems, may indeed help him in certain situations in his life (after all, music undoubtedly
has positive uses and I am not denying that), but it is also likely to lead to some
psychological trouble too – of a kind that the dominant conception does not recognise.
In Paul’s case, the quest for personal authenticity through music becomes so important
that it almost seems to fill his house, in spite of the objections of his partner. Yet this
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authenticity is somehow transferred on to the collection, and music can sometimes seem
elusive compared with the solidity of these ordered and alphabeticised commodities.
It is also useful in this context to consider the gendered nature of record collecting – and
arguably collecting more broadly. It is not fair to try to interpret Paul’s motivations on
the basis of a short interview, but it seems reasonable to think that at the very least the
obsessive pursuit of completeness and order exhibited by collectors such as Paul might
also be an example of disavowal, in that huge amounts of time and effort and emotion
are devoted to categorisation and knowledge, rather than to music as a source of
‘emotional work’ (in DeNora’s sense). In fact, almost inevitably, most of the records and
CDs in Paul’s vast collection went unplayed, and he admitted to having difficulty in
discussing his emotional engagement with music. There are strongly gendered
dimensions to such disavowal; boys in modern societies can be strongly discouraged
from open displays of emotion. But, combined with dynamics of social power that are
somewhat underplayed in the dominant conception, this can lead to exclusions. As Will
Straw (1997: 15) has incisively discussed, the ‘nerdish homosociality’ of record
collectors, while relatively harmless compared with more blatant displays of masculinist
power in popular music cultures, is as fundamental to the unequal gender politics of pop
as any phallic guitar strutting.
Status competition through music
I turn now to another problematic aspect of music-self-society relations downplayed by
the dominant model of music consumption, where music is seen as a positive resource
for forging self-identity. This is the way that the use of music for self-realisation, self-
management or self-recognition can be subject to aspects of competitive individualism
that tend to be prevalent throughout modern societies. The work of Pierre Bourdieu is
relevant here. Where writers from various disciplines and traditions (including ‘consumer
culture theory’ and media studies of ‘active audiences’ – see above) see an abundance of
creative agency in contemporary cultural consumption, Bourdieu’s Distinction is well
known for stressing its darker, competitive aspects. In fact, Bourdieu singles out music
from all other forms of culture in terms of its power to act as a marker of class
differentiation.8 And this is bound up, for Bourdieu, with a number of factors: the way in
which music is particularly associated with ‘interiority’; an emphasis on the value of
‘listening’ in modern societies – including in psychoanalysis (which Bourdieu distrusted);
and the socially imputed purity of music, its tendency to slip towards negation of the
world.
There have been responses to Bourdieu from sociologists of music (Frith 1996, Hennion
2003; see also Hesmondhalgh, 2006, on Bourdieu’s assumptions about popular culture as
manifest in his studies of cultural production). In my view, in terms of the concerns of
this article, Bourdieu is too cynical about the role of aesthetic experience, and this may in
part derive from his excessively sociological analysis, which is also curiously lacking in
any consideration of the emotions when it comes to cultural consumption. Nevertheless,
Bourdieu helps us to see that cultural consumption can not be so easily separated from
8 ‘Nothing more clearly affirms one’s “class”, nothing more infallibly classifies, than
tastes in music’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 19). The contrast with the dominant conception of
music consumption is worth noting, along with its opposition to wider views, including
leading musicologist Nicholas Cook who asserts that ‘music is an essentially democratic
art’ (1990: 2).
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the competitive individualism of modern societies as writers such as Finnegan, DeNora
and Frith imply.
In his article, ‘On status competition and emotion management’ (1991), the Dutch
historical sociologist Cas Wouters offers a perspective on modern competitive
individualism that in my view is more useful for considering music consumption in
relation to emotion and self-identity than Bourdieu’s work. Wouters traces how in some
respects it has become increasingly difficult for powerful groups to show superiority
through traditional means such as ‘birth’, displays of wealth and physical violence.
Instead displays of efforts to experiment with new lifestyles and tastes become
increasingly important in the everyday lives of many people in advanced industrial
societies, and so too does an awareness and knowledge of emotions. In some circles and some
situations, we might say, being a sensitive emotional individual is a key marker of
superiority. Such superiority needs at its best (its most superior) to come naturally – and
this means, for Wouters, that much of the work involved is done in secret in order to
conceal from others the effort needed to articulate oneself as an authentic individual.
Wouters does not say in this article how the dynamics he observes may take different
forms in different social spaces – for example, amongst different social classes.
Nevertheless, I think that there is something suggestive here for the study of music.
Music can be part of status battles to show one’s open-ness to a variety of lifestyle
pleasures and one’s superior emotional range. After all, as we saw at the beginning of this
article, music has come to be linked, perhaps more than any other cultural form, with the
emotional dimensions of our selves.
Competitive individualism is also a relevant frame for examining how people talk about
music’s capacity to intensify sociality, celebrated in much of the literature (Filmer, 2003).
Whether in the dance club, at a funeral, or on a radio show inviting its audience to look
back nostalgically on past times, music offers the emotional intensity craved by modern
consumerism (recalling Honneth’s account, above). This can be about sadness, catharsis,
and self-awareness; but it can also be about fun, pleasure and sociality. In a hedonistic
society of the kind hypothesised by Honneth, then, music may actually be attached even
more strongly than other socio-cultural forms to a certain duty to have pleasure. 9 By this, I
refer to the way modern individuals compete over who is having the most fun, who is
gaining most from life. To use modern language, anyone who is not living it large is a
loser.
I suggest, then, that there are two ways in which music might be the basis of status
battles in modern society: in terms of the emotional sensitivity of its consumers, and in
terms of its basis for hedonistic pleasures. To investigate these issues, I now turn again to
interview material.
Case study 2: competition over sensitivity and pleasure
We asked our interviewees to play us records that brought back strong memories
through music, and to discuss them. John, a 27-year-old teacher living in Cumbria, played
us a club version of a track by Garlic called ‘Not Over Yet’ (remixed by Paul Oakenfold).
9 Bourdieu discusses ‘pleasure as a duty’ in discussing the emerging cultural habits of ‘the
new petite bourgeoisie’ (1984: 367). Also relevant here is Featherstone’s notion of
‘calculating hedonism’ (1991).
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When I first heard it, it was played in a club in Liverpool, right at the end of the
night. It’s actually called ‘It’s Not Over Yet’ and the music sort of went out and
everybody thought it was time to go home, and then this came on […] and I
just thought great, it’s not over yet.
Here music serves, for reasons that DeNora (2000: 66-8) discusses eloquently in Music as
Everyday Life, as a repository for memory. It is because music, like clothing or smells, is
part of ‘the material and aesthetic environment’ in which it is experienced that the past
comes alive when certain music is heard. DeNora, as ever, uses vibrantly positive
language to describe this. The creation of musical ‘moments’ are ‘due in part to the
alchemy of respondents’ perceived or sensed “rightness” or resonance between the
situation, the social relationship, the setting, the music, and themselves as emerging
aesthetic agents’ (67).
I reiterate my view that music can have these positive dimensions. But a more balanced
sociology of music needs to recognise that music will also be tied to problematic aspects
of the self, perhaps especially in societies like ours. There is a methodological issue here
in examining interview material. People’s memories are unreliable – they may recall
happy times through music that were in fact riddled with ambivalence. They may even
unconsciously present themselves as having lives (past or present) that are more rounded
and dynamic than they really are. Such tricks of memory can be helpful: in bad times, a
certain memory – invoked by music or not – may give people hope that the future might
be good again, as the past once was. But it may also romanticise or sentimentalise
relationships that were in fact deeply difficult and painful. And music is perhaps
especially prone to such romanticisation or sentimentalisation, because of the special way
in which it evokes that intensity of feeling and of collective hedonism that we are
encouraged to feel is a mark of being a successful person in capitalist modernity (see
above).
In fact, it transpired that this was the last time that this young man went clubbing with
his friends. John was by the time of the interview living in rural Cumbria. John indicated
elsewhere in his interview that this was not an easy place for him to be, and there was a
poignancy to this choice of record: why choose a record explicitly associated with
collective fun with friends in the city, when living in this rather isolated environment? We
should not rule out the possibility that his choice of this particular musical memory is
both an example of how music can positively provide some comfort in recollections
made from a different position in one’s life, but that it also might be a way in which an
interviewee presents herself or himself as having a more rounded and satisfying life than
is actually the case. Perhaps John chose a clubbing record to say ‘I am someone who has
friends, who knows how to have fun in the big city’. This is not music’s ‘fault’ and there
is nothing ‘wrong’ with John doing this – but it means that to see music as a positive
resource in self-making may not tell the whole story. Or, to put it another way, there are
more ways to read John’s responses than via the lens of music as a positive resource for
self-identity.
Let me now analyse further interview material, in terms of competitive individualism
over ‘emotional sensitivity’. Here I want to outline some different ways in which middle-
class people are able to present themselves to interviewers as rounded, musically sensitive
individuals. I want to take just three different examples: James, a retired university
lecturer; Ian, a social worker; and Lauren, a church minister. In all three cases, I discuss
how these people have successfully incorporated a critique of snobbery or exclusion into
their accounts, in order to present themselves as open-minded and sensitive people. (And
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this is one of the things that makes Wouters a more appropriate lens through which to
view this material than Bourdieu).
First, James, a retired university lecturer in metallurgy, who talked about a favourite
Mozart piece (K563): ‘it’s called a divertimento which suggests something light but it’s
actually a most profound piece of chamber music, fully the equal of any of his string
quartets and of course they are as lovely as anything in the world’. There are echoes here
of some of Bourdieu’s respondents in Distinction (for example, the case study of the ‘truly
classical’ university teacher: see Bourdieu, 1984: 288-90). But James was doing more than
just displaying his cultural capital – he was also making an implicit set of claims about his
emotional sensitivity to music, and the way it fitted into his relations with others. In
talking about music he does not like, James was extremely careful to qualify his
comments. (‘I mean it’s always it’s all right for you, it’s easy for you to talk, you’ve had a
silver spoon in your mouth all your life’). He also differentiated himself from a ‘cold’,
technical or intellectual approach to loving music, embodied in the figure of a piano
teacher he knew from church (and this anecdote was followed immediately by ‘I like her
very much as a person’):
I think she probably thinks I’m a frivolous old devil but she teaches a lot of the
youngsters and […] every now and then she puts on little concerts of her
protégés in church after the Sunday service with proceeds to a charity or
something like that. And I remember going up to her once after a concert
which I had been very impressed by and amongst other things I said - meaning
it entirely as a compliment to her - ‘Well, […] you have achieved something
because your pupils obviously enjoy making music’. She looked at me and she
almost spat and said ‘music isn’t about enjoyment it’s about understanding’.
What better way of illustrating one’s own capacity for enjoyment, for pleasure, than by
invoking the figure of someone who is devoted entirely to an insensitive notion of
musical understanding?
Second, Ian, a business studies lecturer from London. Ian was one of a number of
respondents who emphasised how his tastes had expanded over time, and who was
therefore able to put together a personal narrative based on a growing aesthetic
consciousness. Ian emphasised his growing omnivorousness (‘I’ve always been interested
in literature and music I would say, I’ve always been interested in most things really, and
I suppose what you would call current affairs and what’s going on in the world and that
kind of thing’). The thread through his expanding musical tastes, beginning with rock (‘it
was actually more in my mid to late teens that I got into music, you know like we used to
listen to John Peel late at night and heard stuff like Captain Beefheart and Kevin Coyne
and the Soft Machine’), and expanding into contemporary music, was the idea of ‘weird’
sounds. Ian set this against the ‘blandness’ of ‘boring’ music, across a wide range of
musical genres, from soft rock (‘when I was in Mozambique, there was a guy who was
particularly into Hotel California by the Eagles, which I absolutely hated and despised’) to
traditional rock and roll (‘I just found it utterly boring, utterly tedious’ – as opposed to
the ‘magic’ of blues artists like Robert Johnson) to Mozart (‘there was a bit of Mozart on
the radio and I was saying how fucking boring it sounded, and how tedious Mozart was’).
But Ian displayed his musical – and emotional - open-ness by showing that he was able
to find value in unlikely places, indicating a growing sensitivity that comes with age:
Ian: […] his ex-partner was really into the Pet Shop Boys and we had this
argument about the Pet Shop Boys, he was telling me how they actually have
really good well-put-together pop songs - which actually I can hear. You
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know stuff I would have really hated in the past, I’ve had my ears opened to,
bits of George Michael you know.
Finally, Lauren, an American woman in her forties, but who had lived in an English city
for twenty five years, and who was working as an ordained minister at a local church.
Lauren expressed her sadness and anger at the legacy of imperialism via music (‘it
saddens me no end when I hear Indian and African Victorian hymns, I think “where’s
their music, where’s their culture?”’) and, when asked to play us a piece of music that she
had recently enjoyed, chose a track called ‘Oh Robin’, from an album called Music for a
Harmonious World. This featured singers from England singing in collaboration with
singers from South Africa. What Lauren valued was how the music ‘allowed each other’s
genres to be there, the English people are singing English style music, the Africans
singing African music and the way it moves together is just stunning.’. This is not just an
aesthetic experience, Lauren is saying, it is also ethical, tied to concerns about
imperialism and oppression.
Now all these interviewees are involved in using music to construct self-identity. All of
them do so sincerely. All of them eschew snobbery by opposing symbols of high culture
(the cold, technical piano player; Mozart, hailed as a genius, is in fact ‘boring’; the
Victorians who could not accept otherness). The problem is that, in our class-divided
society, these people are actually engaged in a new form of status battle, which has
replaced the ‘sense of distinction’ analysed by Bourdieu (1984). Important contributions
to the sociology of consumption have drawn attention to some of these changing
dynamics, including how omnivorousness has replaced snobbery as the goal of
‘highbrow’ taste.10 Here I am trying to capture changing dynamics that are specific to
music. My claim is that in-depth analysis of qualitative interviews can lead to very
different conclusions about music, emotion and self-identity from those drawn by the
dominant conception.
A further point is worth noting briefly. It is difficult to imagine working-class subjects
being able to tell such convincing stories of self-realisation through music. Rather, our
working-class interviewees tended to be flummoxed by attempts to articulate what they
like in music. This means that relying on interviews with middle-class subjects in
examining musical self-identity in music – as DeNora does - is likely to lead to an
incomplete sociology of music.
Concluding comments
What are the implications of these arguments for the analysis of musical consumption?
The main implication is that studies of musical consumption need to be much more
cautious in the models of subjectivity they operate. In Tia DeNora’s work, for example,
there is a considerable and mostly welcome emphasis on the inter-relations of music, self
and society. But her notion that individuals are capable of somehow producing their own
subjectivity via music is problematic. It not only downplays the limits and constraints on
that self-making that derive from psychological limitations, it also posits a model of
social self-making that downplays or even ignores negative social processes. The positive
way in which the dominant conception understands people’s uses of music needs to be
10 A seminal example is Peterson and Kern (1996). However, see Warde, Martens and
Olsen, (1999) for a helpful survey and critique of some of this American empirical work
on the sociology of consumption.
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complemented. Apparently positive notions of authenticity and autonomy have been
incorporated into powerful ideologies – not fully, but at least partially.
There are implications too for the study of cultural consumption. Consumer culture
theory, for example, as outlined by Arnould and Thompson (2005) shows some striking
similarities with what I am here calling the dominant conception of music, emotion and
self-identity. It emphasises the active reworking by consumers of meanings encoded in
consumer products and the use by these consumers of cultural resources to ‘produce’
their own identities. Similarly, there is a huge amount of work in media studies which
purports to show the same dynamics at work amongst media consumers. But if my
criticisms of the dominant conception are correct, then this suggests that consumer
culture theory and media sociology also need to be much more cautious in applying these
ideas to contemporary consumption and self-identity.
I want to make it clear that my approach here is not an Adornian one. It may
superficially seem to have something in common with Adorno’s approach to music, in
that it stresses the inter-relatedness of music and certain aspects of social power. And it is
true that no-one has applied a historical understanding of subjectivity so relentlessly to
musical culture as a whole than did Adorno. His writings on music have been criticised
by many for being historicist, for being insufficiently attuned to the active role of
individuals in constructing meaning and for his speculative drawing of inferences about
society from the analysis of particular social phenomena or merely from artistic works.
Bigger problems for me are his idealist requirement that art should aspire to impossible
levels of autonomy and dialectic, his failure to recognise adequately the ambivalence and
complexity in both ‘high culture’ and ‘popular culture’ and, linked to this, his seeming
contempt for everyday cultural consumption in modern societies. A significant challenge
for critical analysts, then, is to produce a historically-informed but non-Adornian account
of music-related subjectivity. My aim here is to contribute to such a project, and not to
revive Adornian criticism (see Born, 1993 for important reflections on these issues).
Neither is my approach here a Foucauldian one. Foucault developed a notion of
subjectivity that has been hugely influential and which provides an alternative to the
interactionist and pragmatist notion of the self that dominates much sociology, and
which lies at the heart of the dominant conception of music, self and society criticised in
this article. Foucault’s notion of subjectivity places much more emphasis on power and
constraint. It sees the self as constituted in power and discourse, and the job of the
critical analyst is to reveal how the self came to be thought of in the ways that it generally
is in modern societies. Foucauldians would generally share my suspicion of the notion of
active self-making from cultural resources – but from a different standpoint. For
Foucault’s notion of the self (for example, Foucault, 2000) has little or no room for the
discussion of emotions, of experience, or any notion of interiority. These are all elements
which I think are important to an adequate sociological notion of music consumption in
relation to self-identity (for a helpful survey of these issues, comparing different
theoretical conceptions of self-identity, see Elliott, 2008).
Music, like other cultural forms, provides opportunities for people to make connections
with each other, to enrich their inner lives, and even, in some cases, to enhance a sense
of community. Some people are lucky enough to be able to exploit these opportunities to
the full. But because of a number of socio-historical factors discussed in this article, and
also for psychological reasons that I have not been able to explore fully here, music’s
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power to enable self-making is constrained, limited, and damaged. An adequate sociology
of musical consumption needs to recognise this political complexity.
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